Historically, a great many features of organisms have been said to show a trend over the history of life, and many rationales for such trends have been proposed. Here I review eight candidates, eight "live hypotheses" that are inspiring research on largest-scale trends today: entropy, energy intensiveness, evolutionary versatility, developmental depth, structural depth, adaptedness, size, and complexity. For each, the review covers the principal arguments that have been advanced for why a trend is expected, as well as some of the empirical approaches that have been adopted. Also discussed are three conceptual matters arising in connection with trend studies: 1. Alternative bases for classifying trends: pattern versus dynamics; 2. alternative modes in which largest-scale trends have been studied: "exploratory" versus "skeptical"; and 3. evolutionary progress.
INTRODUCTION
The history of life is full of trends. Horses increased in size in the Cenozoic; shell sutures in ammonoids became more convoluted in the late Paleozoic and Mesozoic; in gastropods, the number of independent parameters controlling shell shape increased in the early Paleozoic; and clones of eukaryotic cells became integrated to form the first multicellular organisms sometime during the Proterozoic. In this 3.6-billion-year riot of small-and moderate-scale changein which billions of species have been careening about in a structure and function space of huge and changing dimensionality-many have wondered whether any 293 0066-4162/98/1120-0293$08.00 large-scale order is expected. Is there some feature of organisms that we can expect to have changed directionally, on average, over the entire history of life as a whole, at the largest temporal and taxonomic scale? To put it another way, do we have any reason in theory to believe that organisms in later time periods will be different in some consistent way-in some aspect of their individual development, morphology, physiology, behavior, and so on-from those in earlier times?
Quite a few candidates have been proposed, both for features showing such a trend and for possible causes. Lamarck (48) thought complexity increased as a result of the activity of invisible fluids within organisms. Huxley (37) raised the possibility that selection favors increases in ability to modify the environment. More recently, Vermeij (117; see below) has proposed that organisms become more escalated, or energy intensive. And Maynard Smith & Szathmáry (53; see below) have argued that the salient trend has been in what might be called structural depth, with increases occurring in a small number of key transitions, each involving changes in the way that organisms transmit information. Other features said to increase include entropy, evolutionary versatility, developmental entrenchment, intelligence, independence from the environment, specialization, and ability to sense the environment. (For others, see 5, 6, 23, 37, 79, 94.) Many of these hypotheses have nearly dropped out of evolutionary discourse, some because the feature identified has so far proved empirically intractable and the hypothesis has therefore failed to generate much research (e.g. perhaps Huxley's notion that ability to modify the environment increases). Others are not now taken seriously because their theoretical bases have been undermined (e.g. Lamarck) or because the language in which they were presented is incommensurate with modern discourse (perhaps Lamarck again).
Nevertheless, some are still, or have become, what the psychologist William James (42) would have called "live hypotheses." They are the candidates for large-scale trends that are intelligible today and that now capture the imagination of evolutionists and inspire research. In the first part of the discussion below, I list eight such candidates-entropy, energy intensiveness, evolutionary versatility, developmental depth, structural depth, adaptedness, size, and complexity-and for each discuss some of the rationales for increase that have been proposed. Some, such as Cope's rule, are well known and need little exposition. Others, such as the thermodynamic view, are not well understood, or have been largely overlooked, by the evolutionary community and therefore need more. As will be seen, the features are interrelated. For example, four on the list-evolutionary versatility, developmental depth, structural depth, and complexity-are aspects of complexity (65) .
The focus is on causes, on theoretical arguments for why a given feature might be expected to increase. A major goal is to identify the testable predictions that each hypothesis makes. In some cases, a sample of the relevant evidence is also presented, mainly to show how the concepts involved have been operationalized or applied in the study of real trends. Summarizing and evaluating the available evidence is a larger project than can be attempted here.
The point of the list is only to review possibilities, to see where we stand theoretically in our understanding of the forces at work in evolution at the largest scale. Thus, inclusion on this list carries no endorsement of any kind (nor does omission imply rejection). Indeed, in the present state of our understanding, the possibility that no forces have operated at the largest scale, that the history of life has been dominated by chance events (32) , and that no largest-scale trend has occurred in any feature of organisms, probably ought to count as a live hypothesis. However, the difficulties involved in testing these possibilities are not trivial (13, 57, 78, 80, 81) , and they too merit longer discussions than are possible here.
A certain amount of arbitrariness is unavoidable in choosing the live hypotheses. A reasonable case could be made for including certain other candidates for trends, such as specialization or ecophenotypy. [Bambach's (8) recent suggestion that "physiological resilience" increases might soon belong on the list, but the idea has not yet been fully explicated.] In any event, the list is intended to be preliminary.
Three Issues
I also discuss certain methodological and philosophical issues arising in connection with trend studies, and for each I offer or defend a conceptual distinction that may help to resolve them. First, discussions of the causes of trends have been overconcerned with two sorts of pattern: rising maxima and stable minima. For size, an increase in the maximum for some group would be an increase over time in the size of the largest species in the group (12) . A stable minimum might be the persistence of the group's smallest species. What sometimes confounds discussions of causes is that an increase in the maximum has seemed to support the existence of a directed, pervasive force (perhaps selection), tending to drive a trend, while a stable minimum has suggested that no driving force exists. However, a close look at the dynamics of large-scale trends reveals that both patterns are the expected result of a number of very different mechanisms, and that neither is conclusive evidence for or against driving forces. More generally, I argue that distinguishing trends based on their dynamics, rather than on the patterns they produce, would reduce confusion and encourage theorists to address certain fundamental issues.
Second, I propose that studies of largest-scale trends can be classified into two types, or modes of inquiry, based on differences in the way they frame questions and use data. One is the "exploratory" or hypothesis-generation mode and the other is the "skeptical" or hypothesis-testing mode. Both modes are essential to progress, but the skeptical mode has been underemphasized, I argue.
Finally, trends at the largest scale have always been associated with notions of evolutionary progress (86) . I conclude by arguing that the term progress might be appropriate in this context, if it is understood in a certain sense, but that using it in this sense could place us in an awkward position: That is, we might be forced to acknowledge that a trend in a feature we do not value constitutes a kind of progress.
Scope
As indicated, I am concerned only with trends at the largest scale, those thought to characterize life or the evolutionary process as a whole. Topics not covered include trends unique to particular groups (e.g. in animals, 59; in plants, 72) , trends in single lineages (13, 57, 80) , and the analysis of evolutionary rates (29) . Also omitted are methods for establishing that trends have occurred, such as recent cladistic methods for inferring ancestral character states (20a) .
Finally, the discussion is limited to features at the organism level, in other words, the size, complexity, fitness, and so on, of individual organisms. (Occasionally, it is convenient to refer to features of species, but in these cases species are understood to be characterized by the typical or mean values of their member individuals.) Excluded are trends in global diversity (9a, 92) , in space (40, 91) , in ecosystem structure (102) , and in ecospace occupation (7) .
Of course, taxonomic levels may be independent, and as will be seen, this potential independence creates two sorts of difficulties. On the one hand, a hypothesis may not specify the level at which a trend is expected to be manifest, in which case testing is difficult, because we do not know whether to expect a trend in individuals (e.g. possibly entropy; see below). On the other hand, theory may unambiguously predict a trend at the level of the individual, but observed trends may be interpretable as the result of higher-level sorting (e.g. energy intensiveness; see below). Neither problem is insurmountable in principle (e.g. 50, 120).
LIVE HYPOTHESES
For each candidate, I give some of the principal arguments that have been advanced for why a large-scale increase is expected. The ordering of the list is not entirely arbitrary; I give priority to the hypotheses that are likely to be less familiar to biologists or conceptually more difficult.
Entropy
In recent years, a number of biologists have been developing a new outlook based on thermodynamics (16, 126) . [Thermodynamic views have surfaced in biology on other occasions (e.g. 90) .] Advocates of this outlook have struggled to render it in terms accessible to mainstream biologists but have not been successful on the whole. One problem has been, I believe, that the high level of generality at which thermodynamics offers explanations is rarely encountered in biology. More concretely, thermodynamic principles do not address the particulars of change in specific groups of organisms or in specific ecological circumstances, but rather they concern the principles of change in general, in all life (indeed, in all "dissipative structures;" see below), everywhere it occurs.
Here, I attempt to distill from the writings of the outlook's major advocates the predictions that are relevant to large-scale trends. In doing so, I distinguish two schools of thermodynamic thought, corresponding to the two classical formulations of the second law of thermodynamics in physics, the information school (16, 17, 20, 87, 128 ) and the energy school (99, 101, (125) (126) (127) . A synthesis of the two schools may be possible (e.g. 87), but here I offer separate treatments. I should note that on account of theoretical disagreements within each school, it is likely that some who hold these views would not concur with my distillation. Finally, for both schools, my presentation is necessarily somewhat circuitous: I begin with the relevant thermodynamic principles and then explain their significance for evolutionary trends.
THE INFORMATION SCHOOL The relevant thermodynamic principle for the information school is the second law itself, which for present purposes can be stated as follows: Change in a closed system that is not at equilibrium will occur in such a way as to increase the total amount of disorder, or entropy, of the system. To see what this means, imagine a gas that is confined (at a low density) inside a rectangular box, and further confined to one half of the box by a removable partition. If we remove the partition, the gas rapidly diffuses into the empty half of the box, filling it. The disorder, or entropy, of the gas has increased. This increase in entropy can be interpreted as informational in that the uncertainty, or lack-of-information, associated with the location of every gas molecule increased in the expansion. Before the partition was removed, we could at least say of any given gas molecule that we knew which half of the box it was in; afterward, we know less about its location. Consistent with the formulation favored by the information school, the diffusion could be said to satisfy the demand of the second law that informational entropy increase, and therefore, in a sense, could also be said to be a consequence of the second law.
The information school takes this example as illustrative of the dynamics of evolving taxa, noting that taxa can also split or branch as well as diffuse. That is, evolution can be understood as a kind of entropically driven production (branching) and diffusion of taxa in multidimensional descriptive spaces. Consider a genetic space in which each dimension corresponds to a genetic locus and coordinates in each dimension correspond to the various alleles available at that locus at a given time. In such a space, a species could be plotted as a single point, perhaps at its mean or modal genotype, and the evolution of a species would correspond to movement of the point in genotype space. One claim of the information school is that, under the influence of mutation alone, and therefore in the absence of selection, a group of related taxa, or clade, is expected to grow and to diffuse throughout its genotype space. In doing so, its component species are expected to diverge from each other, thereby increasing the clade's entropy (in the informational sense) over time and satisfying the demands of the second law. More simply (although less precisely), the second law predicts that divergence will occur, even without selection.
A parallel argument could be made at the scale of organisms. If the axes define a morphospace, with coordinates corresponding to the dimensions (or other characteristics) of organs or body parts, then an individual organism becomes a cluster of points, and the evolution of form becomes the movement of the cluster in morphospace. Here the second law predicts that morphology should tend to become more differentiated, more complex, even in the absence of selection.
In clade diffusion, it might seem that a clade should eventually fill the space, but in fact the space does not fill for two reasons. First, constraints are present, such as natural selection, which disfavor many allelic combinations. Second, the space itself is expanding over time, as mutation and gene duplication introduce new alleles and new loci, producing an on-going combinatorial explosion of new possibilities. Another prediction of the information school is that the size of the space will tend to increase faster than diffusion within it. In the gas analogy, it is as though the box were expanding faster than the gas inside. The entropy of the gas increases, but to an observer in the frame of reference of the expanding box, the gas appears to collapse down into one corner. For diffusion of form, the effect is to create the appearance of increased "organization" or structuring of form ( Figure 1 ).
These predictions seem testable. Indeed, the prediction that species diversity and complexity of form will increase might seem trivial, but for complexity at least, no trend has been documented in any rigorous way. (For explicitly thermodynamic empirical treatments at a small scale, see 54, 55; for a broader review of empirical work, see 65.) But even if complexity does increase, the trend mechanism has not been established and is crucial in this context (see below). The second prediction, that the disparity between realized and potential genome space or morphospace should increase over time, is decidedly not trivial, but no tests have been done to my knowledge. H max represents its potential entropy, which is a function of the size of the morphological space. Both increase, but H lags behind. Also, the difference between H and H max increases, which accounts for the appearance of increasing "organization," or specificity of structure, in organisms.
THE ENERGY SCHOOL The predictions of the energy school follow from the phenomenological principle that, in open, far-from-equilibrium systems, structures emerge whose effect is to dissipate free-energy gradients. The paradigmatic example for the energy school is the Bénard convection cell (99, 113) . Imagine a thin layer of viscous fluid spread evenly over a flat dish or plate. The plate is heated uniformly from below, creating a temperature gradient across the fluid. If the gradient is maintained below a critical threshold, heat flows by disordered collisions among fluid molecules (i.e. by conduction) from source below to sink above. If the gradient is increased above the threshold, however, the fluid flow spontaneously becomes structured at a large scale. Viewed from above, the surface of the fluid is no longer a smooth sheet but rather a honeycomb of closely-packed, nearly hexagonal, cells. The cells are convection structures, in which the centers are regions of mass fluid flow upward and the edges mark regions of downward flow. Importantly, with the emergence of these convection cells, the rate of flow of heat from the lower surface to the air above increases enormously. The cells are said to be "dissipative structures," or structures that exist and are maintained because of the contribution they make to the dissipation of the increased free-energy gradient.
Similar structures include natural vortices, such as tornados and hurricanes. Dissipative structures also arise in certain far-from-equilibrium chemical systems, typically as self-catalyzing cycles or networks. Indeed, the origin of life can be seen as the spontaneous formation of autocatalytic chemical cycles, which were thermodynamically favored on account of their contribution to dissipating the free energy gradient between the earth (heated by the sun) and colder surrounding space.
Both physical and chemical dissipative structures share a number of properties. First, growth and multiplication are both favored (in the Bénard apparatus described above, only initially), in that they augment the flow through the system, increasing the rate at which free energy is dissipated. Second, variations or perturbations occurring in these structures that tend to enhance the flow are favored over those that do not, a purely physical principle that produces and accounts for a kind of "natural selection" in dissipative systems that contain a number of such structures. Thus, in this view, organisms are distinguished from nonliving dissipative structures, not in their ability to spontaneously acquire definite structure, to grow, to reproduce, or even to evolve by natural selection. Rather, they are distinguished by possessing DNA, whose principal role is to confer stability and persistence, not only in ontogeny but on phylogenetic timescales as well.
Many dissipative structures, including organisms, undergo a continuous development throughout their existence. In particular, the energy school has drawn attention to four phenomenological rules for dissipative structures, mostly drawn from the principles of ecological succession developed by Lotka, Odum, Margelef, and others. Under certain initial conditions and constraints, dissipative structures show: 1. After an initial increase, a decrease in the rate of energy flow (per unit mass); 2. an increase in internal complexity, or degree of differentiation, although at a decreasing rate; 3. a general decrease in internal rates of change; and 4. increasing vulnerability to external perturbations, i.e. senescence.
These principles can be understood as predictions for trends, all eminently testable, at least in principle, and indeed some have been shown to occur in organismal development and in ecosystems. But for evolutionary-as opposed to ontogenetic-change in organisms, testing is problematic at certain scales where identification of the relevant dissipative structure is difficult. For example, it is not clear that the second rule predicts increasing complexity of individual morphology; whether or not it does depends on whether an evolving lineage constitutes a dissipative structure (whose physical parts are the organs and other elements we usually think of as constituting morphology). Further consideration of such issues is needed to make the predictions testable in practice.
Energy Intensiveness Vermeij (117, 118) has argued that growth and reproduction in organisms is limited by their ability to find, consume, and defend resources, and that the principal obstacles to success are competitors, predators, and dangerous prey. Such a selective regime, he maintains, is expected to favor evolutionary changes that augment or improve such organismal features as offensive weapons, defensive armor, locomotor performance (including ability to attack and to escape), toxicity, crypsis, ability to gather and process information about the environment, growth rate, and metabolic rate. The common requirement for all of these changes is an increased flow of energy into and through an organism, or an increase in its energy intensiveness (what Vermeij calls "escalation").
Vermeij points out that evolutionary modification is typically constrained by functional trade-offs, so that, for example, a change in some structure that improves one function is likely to interfere with function in another. Consequently, he argues, increases in energy intensiveness are most likely to occur when resources are plentiful and such constraints are relaxed. He points to two periods in the Phanerozoic in particular, the early Paleozoic and the late Mesozoic, when nutrient and energy fluxes through the biosphere were substantially elevated by increases in submarine volcanism, and he argues that these (and possibly other such episodes as well) drove increases in the production of evolutionary innovations and in diversity during those times (119) .
In his 1987 book, Vermeij discusses the various routes to increase in energy intensiveness that have been discovered in a variety of taxa, but focuses on molluscs, especially on improvements in drilling capability in certain gastropods and in armor in both gastropods and bivalves. Empirical studies have followed his lead: for example, Kelley & Hansen (45) found that naticid gastropods became more selective in their choice of prey, arguably as a route to increasing the net return on their energy investment in drilling. Miller (68) (69) (70) found increases in ornamentation in muricine gastropods that are consistent with escalation, although alternative mechanisms could not be excluded (e.g. 69). One major empirical problem has been determining to what extent apparent escalation is the result of individual-level selection rather than differential speciation and extinction, as well as determining to what extent the two levels are coupled (120) .
Evolutionary Versatility
Evolutionary versatility is a function of number of degrees of independence in development, or number of independent dimensions along which variation can occur in evolution (77) . Vermeij (114) (115) (116) raised the possibility that versatility should tend to increase in evolution, because it increases the range of adaptive possibilities, which permits greater homeostasis, mechanical efficiency, and ability to exploit resources. His argument also suggests that versatility should be most favored when energy resources are plentiful, adaptive constraints are reduced, and therefore selection for energy intensiveness is strongest.
Riska (84) proposed that new organismal traits tend to be highly correlated developmentally, or with other traits when they arise. [This might be expected if new traits commonly begin as duplications of parts and of their associated developmental pathways (49) .] If so, selection might favor decreases in developmental integration, thereby allowing new combinations of trait values and new adaptive possibilities.
Wagner & Altenberg (123; see also 122) have argued that genotype-phenotype maps in organisms tend to be modular, or organized in such a way that groups of genes interact strongly among themselves in the development of single characters, but pleiotropic interactions among characters are fewer and weaker. Modularity enables characters to vary independently in evolution, and it is this independence that makes phenotypes evolvable. In evolution, modularization can occur by integration, if genotype-phenotype maps tend to be unintegrated initially, or by disintegration, what they call "parcellation," if maps tend to be highly integrated from the start. They argue that evolution in the Metazoa, at least, seems to proceed by parcellation, with the result that selection for evolvability should tend to increase numbers of modules, in other words, to increase numbers of independent developmental units.
Finally, Riedl (83) has made an argument (see below) that could be construed as leading to the opposite prediction. He contended that covariation in development is advantageous because it allows a rapid response to selection, which would seem to imply that versatility is expected to decrease. Interestingly, Vermeij (116) devised a route whereby both versatility and integration may increase alternately in stepwise fashion. He suggested that new dimensions of variation are added in the origin of new adaptive designs, new higher taxa, and that these enlarged suites of variability become more integrated in later evolution within higher taxa; subsequent innovations add more dimensions, which then in turn become integrated, and so on.
Various approaches to measuring degree of integration (e.g. 19, 73, 121, 132) and its opposite, developmental independence (see 65) , have been devised. Also, there has been considerable interest (especially recently) in examining patterns of change in a phylogenetic context (133, and papers following it in the same journal issue). Trends have also been examined using fossils, both in single-species lineages (46, 67) and in certain higher taxa (114) (115) (116) .
Developmental Depth
Development is to some degree hierarchically structured, in that early in development an organism consists of a relatively small number of structures, which interact to give rise to more structures, which in turn give rise to more, in a widening cascade (3, 4, 83, 87, 130 ; although see 36, 76, 131 for exceptions). Thus, early developmental steps have more consequences than later steps, on average, and deleterious natural variation occurring in early steps will be more strongly opposed by selection. In Wimsatt's terms (130) , early steps and the structures arising from them are "generatively entrenched."
Arguably, developmental cascades should become longer, and entrenchment should deepen as organisms evolve. The reason is that, at any given time, the existing steps and structures in a cascade are likely to be at least somewhat integrated (that is, connected with and dependent on each other), so that their removal would tend to be disruptive in a way that addition of a new step or structure would not (88, 89) . Thus, deletions are more likely to be deleterious than additions, on average, and developmental steps and structures should tend to accumulate. If so, then to the extent that additions occur developmentally downstream of existing steps, existing steps will tend to become entrenched, and the overall lability of development should tend to decrease.
Other arguments point to the same conclusion. As discussed, Riedl (83) has argued that covariation in development is advantageous, because it allows a rapid response to selection. He further suggests that covariation may arise by the addition of hierarchical controls in development, and that successive levels of control become superimposed on each other, which increases hierarchical depth. Also, Kauffman's (44) n-k model predicts that long-jumps to higher adaptive peaks in fitness landscapes become increasingly improbable over time, a prediction consistent with increasing developmental depth. And in Salthe's (87) version of the thermodynamic argument, developmental systems become more extended, or in his terms, more specified, in evolving lineages.
Finally, Valentine et al (106; see also 22, 105) propose that, at least within the Metazoa, developmental evolution occurred in two phases. First, the developmental control systems required for basic metazoan architectures (bodyplans) arose, probably in the earliest Cambrian or just before. Thereafter, diversification within bodyplans occurred as a result of elaboration and reorganization of these control systems. In present terms, this view seems to predict a large increase in entrenchment associated with the origin of the Metazoa. And although the subsequent elaboration of developmental pathways might result in occasional further increases in entrenchment, there would seem to be no expectation of an ongoing trend after the Cambrian.
Empirical treatments have focused on changes within higher taxa in disparity, or the degree to which organisms differ from each other morphologically (33, reviewed in 26). Various metrics have been developed (e.g. 15, 25, 26, 43, 129) . The developmental arguments above allow that disparity should increase as diversity increases and morphologies diverge, but they also predict that the rate of increase should fall over time, as developmental programs become more constrained (27, 62; cf. 28) . This pattern has been documented in certain groups (e.g. 24, 124; but see 15) , but in others, the opposite pattern occurs (e.g. 25). In any case, an alternative hypothesis predicts the same trend: increases in the intensity of natural selection, perhaps the result of an increase in ecological packing that accompanies diversification, will tend to reduce rates of morphological divergence (82, 103 ; but see 27, 34, 62). A major challenge for research in this area is to devise ways to test the developmental hypothesis more directly (e.g. 95, 124) .
Structural Depth
Maynard Smith & Szathmáry (53; see also 100) have argued that the major trend in the history of life is an increase in complexity, which is manifest in a series of eight "major transitions": 1. Early replicating molecules to populations of molecules in compartments; 2. unlinked replicators to replicator linkage in chromosomes; 3. the origin of the genetic code and of translation; 4. prokaryote to eukaryote; 5. asexual to sexual reproduction; 6. single-celled existence to multicellularity; 7. solitary existence to coloniality; and 8. the emergence of human social organization based on language.
A common theme in most of these transitions is the emergence of a higher level of nesting of parts within wholes (see also 74, 98) , and therefore an increase in what might be called hierarchical complexity (64, 65 ; see below). In their own terms, what we see is the emergence of new "levels of organization" or new levels of selection (52) . "Entities that were capable of independent replication before the transition can replicate only as part of a larger whole after it" (53, p. 6). They further argue that each of these transitions was accompanied by an increase in differentiation and division of labor within levels, as well as a change in the way that information is transmitted.
Maynard Smith & Szathmáry maintain that each of these transitions should be understood as the result of a series of chance events, in particular, a sequence of preadaptations, each of which was undoubtedly favored by short-term selection but for reasons having nothing to do with the transition itself or its longerterm consequences. Consistent with this description, one might further argue, although they do not, that if all or most of the transitions ultimately produced a significant radiation of new forms, as at least some apparently did, the entire series of transitions could be the result of selection for ever higher levels of inclusiveness, albeit selection at a high taxonomic level and on a very long timescale.
Finally, increasing hierarchical complexity need not involve the addition of new levels. It could instead take the form of increasing individuation of existing ones. An example might be the increase in autonomy, or individuation, at the colony level in certain colonial invertebrates (e.g. 11; reviewed in 65).
Adaptedness
One of the most problematic candidates for a trend at the largest scale is adaptedness, or in certain senses, fitness. The difficulty is that it is unclear whether or not the operation of natural selection predicts a large-scale trend, even if we are only interested in selection at the level of the individual, and even if a very general understanding of adaptedness is adopted, such as "ability to survive and reproduce in a given environment" (14) . Here is the sort of problem that arises:
On the one hand, adaptedness of individuals in a species should increase in absolute terms if environments deteriorate directionally, perhaps as a result of relentless improvement by other species (107) . On the other hand, if environments are complexly varied in time, then arguably selection (on a short time scale) should be able to produce adaptation only to local or transitory environments. To the extent that adaptation is local, or "context sensitive" (23) , in this way, it should not be cumulative (35, 96) .
However, the problem of context sensitivity should be reduced on sufficiently long time scales, in that species surviving numerous changes in the environment could be understood to have been selected for survival in an average of all of the environments experienced (111) . (Of course, as time scales lengthen, selection presumably weakens.) Also, the problem of context sensitivity is removed if adaptedness can be shown to have context-independent aspects (23) . To identify such an aspect we would have to establish a feature or combination of features of organisms that corresponds to adaptedness in all of its manifestations; Van Valen's (108, 110) suggestion that the amount of energy that an organism has available for expansion constitutes a kind of "universal currency" for fitness may be useful here, although it has not yet been operationalized.
In principle, trends in adaptedness can be studied empirically even if theoretical issues have not yet been worked out. One approach is to sidestep the problem of identifying universal features and use the fact of success as a proxy for adaptedness. One tactic within this approach is to use decreasing probability of extinction as an indicator of increasing adaptedness (79, 109) . Another tactic is to use replacement (10, 112) : The fact that one organismal design replaced another in the fossil record, at least raises the possibility of the successor's adaptive superiority (e.g. 41; but see 50). A case can be made even stronger if the replacement can be shown to have occurred multiple times in different environments (e.g. 85); if abundances of the replaced taxon and of its successor are found to be negatively correlated in environments where they overlap, thereby suggesting competition (112) ; if the superiority of the successor can be demonstrated in direct-competition experiments (e.g. 56); or if the pattern of replacement can be shown to fit a model based on competitive interaction (e.g. 93). The overall tactic would seem to be appropriate for documenting improvement in a single transition (even a long-term one); for a series of transitions, the problem of establishing transitivity arises.
A possible difficulty with this tactic is that replacement is often documented at a high taxonomic level. This leaves open the possibility that the increase in adaptedness was the result of a clade-level property, which may or may not have arisen from properties at the level of the individual organism. For example, in principle, one group might supplant another on account of having a higher speciation rate, even if the loser is superior by individual-level design criteria.
Size
Cope's rule is an empirical generalization that the size of individuals tends to increase in most evolutionary groups. Newell (71) discusses a number of possible rationales, such as the advantages of large size in intra-and interspecific competition (18; but see 21). Bonner (12) argues that increases in size may allow, and also be required by, increases in internal division of labor (complexity). The subject has been reviewed by LaBarbera (47) and McKinney (58), and more recently by Jablonski (38) . (For recent empirical treatments see 1, 2, 39.)
Complexity
If complexity is defined narrowly (65) as some function of number of different types of structure or number of independent steps in a process, then four types can be identified for organisms (64) ; three have already been discussed under different names (in parentheses): 1. Hierarchical developmental complexity, or the number of steps in developmental pathways (developmental depth); 2. hierarchical morphological complexity, or the number of levels of nesting of parts within wholes (structural depth); 3. nonhierarchical developmental complexity, or the number of independent steps at a given developmental stage (versatility); and 4. nonhierarchical morphological complexity, or the number of different part types at a given hierarchical level. Elsewhere, I have reviewed theoretical and empirical aspects of this fourth type (61, 65) .
Common Themes and Connections
None of the above list of candidates for largest-scale trends invokes contingent properties of life on earth as the principal cause of increase, and none depends (at least primarily) on long-term directional changes in the abiotic environment, such as changes in solar output, meteorite flux, or distribution of environments. Curiously, all are ordinarily framed as increasing trends, although, in principle, every increasing trend in some variable could equally well be described as a decreasing trend in its inverse variable. This may reflect nothing more than the general optimism of scientists, but it may also reflect the common association between largest-scale trends and progress (86) .
Connections among the candidates are too numerous to list exhaustively. A sample will suffice here: an increase in size, or in structural depth, may also constitute an increase in rate of entropy production; an increase in versatility may also be an increase in informational entropy; increases in energy intensiveness may be correlated with increases in adaptedness. More connections are made explicitly in the theoretical literature cited, and doubtless even more can be imagined. So many are the connections that the possibility of a grand unification should not be ignored (and may already be implicit in some theoretical treatments).
TYPES OF TRENDS
This section suggests a classification of trend causes according to their underlying mechanism or dynamics. The point is to try to clarify the relationship between the hypotheses above and observed, or potentially observable, patterns of change in the mean, maximum, and minimum for the relevant organismal features. Figure 2A shows the diversification of a group. The vertical axis is time and the horizontal axis is what might be called the "state variable" (57): It represents size, complexity, fitness, or any organismal feature in which a trend is thought to occur. The one-dimensional space defined by the state variable and within which diversification occurs is called the "state space." In the figure, the group originates as a single species at some value of the state variable. The assumption is that a species can be characterized by a single value of the state variable at any given time, perhaps the average value for the species. As time passes, new species arise, some become extinct, but diversity increases on average. Also over time, state variable values change, both in the origin of new species and anagenetically between speciation events. (The figure is the output of a computer model; for details, see 63.) For purposes of discussion, let us suppose that the state variable is size. Figure 2A can be understood as a kind of null model, a picture of the expected evolution of size in a diversifying group in the absence of external forces acting in any systematic way on size in the lineages. Importantly, the suggestion is not that changes occurring in lineages are uncaused; rather, it is that, as in diffusion, the causes of change are many and various, perhaps different in each lineage, and most crucially, not dependent in any systematic way on the lineage's location in state space. In this null model, the group simply diversifies, with increases in size occurring as often as decreases; mean size therefore has no tendency to change.
Passive and Driven
In Figure 2B , however, a trend in the mean occurs as a result of diffusion away from a boundary, a lower limit on size (vertical line) for the group. For the evolution of all life, the lower boundary might correspond to the size of the smallest possible organism. The resulting trend mechanism might be called "passive," to indicate that the trend occurs in the absence of any driving forces operating over most of the state space (63) . In Figure 2C , no boundary is present, but instead there is a bias, a pervasive tendency for size increases to occur more often than decreases in most lineages; such a trend mechanism might be called "driven." (See also 23, 31, 35, 51, 57, 97. ) Figure 2D shows a special kind of driven trend that mimics a passive trend in certain respects to be discussed shortly.
Both the passive and driven mechanisms are consistent with a variety of different lower-level causes. A bias might result from selection favoring size increase in all or most lineages, or even-in principle-from internal, developmental tendencies of some kind that are present in most lineages. Likewise, a boundary might result from selection against small species or from developmental constraints on size (97) . Also, boundaries may take a number of different forms, occurring as abrupt or gradual changes in speciation or extinction rate, or even as local biases in the direction of change. Finally, Figure 2 shows only classic or ideal cases; various intermediate and ambiguous cases can be imagined (66) .
The passive-driven scheme has a number of virtues, notably the fact that several tests are available to distinguish empirically between the two categories (63) . Applying such tests to data that show a large-scale trend in some feature of organisms, it will sometimes be possible to eliminate one of the two categories and thereby narrow the range of possible causes considerably. In order for such tests to be decisive, however, we must be able to classify the trend mechanism invoked by a proposed cause as either passive or driven.
Classifying the Live Hypotheses
Classification is straightforward in some cases. For example, Vermeij clearly imagines a driven mechanism for energy intensiveness (117; although a broadly similar passive version of his argument could be devised). The energetic version of the thermodynamic view certainly predicts a driven mechanism. The informational view would seem to be driven also: For morphology, complexity measures are generally variances or variance analogues (61) , which are expected to increase in all lineages, at least in the absence of selection. (Of course, variances may increase imperceptibly slowly, so that simple forms may persist, and the expected driven pattern for informational entropy would be more like Figure 2D than Figure 2C ; see below.) Cope's rule has been acknowledged to have both passive and driven versions, with different predictions for each (38) .
For the remaining hypotheses, theory makes no commitment to either a passive or a driven mechanism, and both versions can be imagined. For example, Maynard Smith & Szathmáry's mechanism would be driven if they predicted that transitions to higher levels of organization occurred more frequently than to lower, as in Figure 2E perhaps. But it would be passive if reductions were about equally frequent and if, as seems plausible, decreases were limited at some low level by a boundary, a lower limit on hierarchical depth.
What the passive-driven distinction does in these and other ambiguous cases is raise questions for theoreticians about the sort of dynamical mechanism envisioned. Does the hypothesis predict merely that increases in the relevant state variable will occur (Figure 2, all cases) , or does it predict that they occur preferentially, more frequently than decreases ( Figure 2C , 2D, and at a larger scale, 2E )? Are lower limits to change expected ( Figure 2B) , and perhaps upper limits as well ( Figure 2F ) ? Also, the scheme shows us why a theorist's acknowledgment that decreases will occur occasionally, and are permitted by the proposed hypothesis, is relatively uninformative. Occasional decreases are expected in all systems (Figure 2 ), except the most extreme driven ones (not shown), which for the most part are implausible anyway.
Behavior of Maxima
The scheme represented in Figure 2 can also help to train our intuition about the behavior of maxima and minima. In the null model (Figure 2A) , the maximum increases. Indeed, the maximum is expected to increase for all but one of the mechanisms illustrated in Figure 2 . Thus, a hypothesis which predicts only that the maximum in a diversifying group will increase makes a very weak claim in dynamical terms. The fact that maximum size has increased since the origin of life (12) , or that the largest nonclonal animal ever exists today, requires no special explanation (31, 35) , either in terms of selection or boundaries, at least not at the scale of evolution as a whole. (Of course, as discussed, every change in every individual lineage will have its own unique explanation.) Likewise for complexity: Even if it were granted that maximum complexity has increased, and that some extant species, such as humans, was the most complex in some sense (cf 65), this pattern could well be the simple consequence of diffusion in a complexity space (104) , in which case no special higher-level explanation would be required. This is not to say that maxima are irrelevant, or that stronger claims about them cannot be made. For example, since diversity has increased on the whole (although with significant interruptions), a long-term leveling off of a maximum would certainly require special explanation, perhaps one that predicts existence of an upper bound of some sort ( Figure 2F ). Also, Maynard Smith & Szathmáry's suggestion that the maximum in hierarchical complexity increased episodically, in occasional revolutions, could be a strong claim if it implies the existence of two distinct causal regimes, one operating during revolutions and another between.
Behavior of Minima
The null model (Figure 2A ) also shows that, in the absence of boundaries, the minimum is expected to decrease. However, no theoretical treatment I know predicts a long-term decrease in the minimum, for any feature of organisms, over the history of life. Rather, the assumption in most hypotheses (often implicit) is that the minimum has not changed. (Some driven mechanisms are exceptions; see above.) Notice first that a static minimum can come about in two ways. One possibility is that the earliest forms had very low values of the state variable and that these forms have persisted more or less unchanged. For example, for complexity, cyanobacteria might have been very simple at the time of their origin in the Archean and might not have changed much in complexity since then. The other possibility is that there has been considerable turnover at the lowest values in state space. For complexity, this might mean that cyanobacteria have in fact become more complex, but that other more complex species have evolved simpler forms, and thus the lowest levels of the complexity space have remained occupied.
More importantly in this context, notice that while a stable minimum might seem to suggest the existence of a boundary and therefore a passive mechanism, this is not the case: A stable minimum can be produced by either a passive ( Figure 2C ) or a weakly driven system ( Figure 2D) . Again, the virtue of this scheme is that it forces the theorist to consider not just the pattern of behavior of the minimum but the sort of lower-level dynamics that is supposed to account for that pattern.
COMPLEMENTARY MODES OF INVESTIGATION
The study of trends in all of life can be (and has been) undertaken in two modes, what might be called the "exploratory" and the "skeptical." In the exploratory mode, we ask what features of organisms might have increased over the history of life? Some candidates may follow from theory, as above. Some may emerge from observation, whether from data collected in a deliberate and organized way or from intuitions-perhaps gestalts that emerge from a survey in the imagination of the history of life. For example, modern organisms might simply seem more complex than ancient ones. (A certain amount of vagueness is sometimes tolerable in this mode; we may not be able to specify yet precisely what we mean by "complexity.") In this mode, the goal is the production of hypotheses, and in pursuit of promising ones, we draw on all our resources.
In the exploratory mode, a common tactic is to investigate the promise of a candidate variable by trying to build a case for it. Arguments in favor are proposed, and possible defenses against counter-arguments are devised. Evidence in favor is marshaled, and apparently contradictory evidence is explained. In this mode, the goal is to investigate whether, and ultimately to show why, the candidate for a trend ought to be considered a viable one, to show why further investigation is worthwhile. Hypotheses produced in this way are what Popper (75) called bold "conjectures."
In the skeptical mode, we ask whether a certain hypothesized trend actually occurred. The hypothesis is formulated in a testable way, with all ambiguity eliminated from the relevant terms, such as fitness or complexity: The terms are operationalized. Cases appropriate for testing, perhaps groups of organisms, are chosen without regard to the likelihood that an increase will be found (except in testing for trends thought to be produced by unique or episodic changes), and to the maximum extent possible, testing is a blind application of operational measures to those cases. Ideally, in the skeptical mode, we approach testing in a neutral frame of mind, with no particular preference for one outcome over another.
Part of the skeptic's job is to be relentless. If the result of a single test is negative, the hypothesis is not necessarily refuted. For one thing, a larger sample may be needed, perhaps application of the tests in more groups of organisms. For another, the possibility needs to be considered that a somewhat different formulation of the hypothesis, or a different approach to operationalizing its terms, might yield a different result. For example, if an increase in versatility is operationalized as a reduction in the linear correlation between developmental variables, and if a test for a trend in the tooth row of mammals is negative (e.g. 67), then first, other structures and other taxa need to be examined, and second, other senses of versatility-perhaps those based on various nonlinear correlations-need to be examined. This program of intense hypothesis-testing corresponds to what Popper (75) called "refutation."
The exploratory and skeptical modes, hypothesis production and hypothesis testing, conjecture and refutation, are obviously complementary, even if-in addition to their methodological differences-the spirit in which their practitioners approach a problem often seems to be at odds. And in practice, most thoughtful research operates to some degree in both modes at once. In the study of trends, considerable skepticism can be found even in the purely theoretical treatments listed above. And the skeptical approach is exploratory, in a sense, in its methodical consideration of, and elimination of, alternatives.
Still, it is clear that the study of trends at the largest scale has been dominated by the exploratory mode. The thermodynamic treatments of both schools; the hypotheses of increasing energy intensiveness, degree of entrenchment, versatility, and adaptedness; and the notion that revolutions have occurred in the way that information is managed and transmitted all seem to have been proposed mainly in the spirit of exploration. And for the most part, such skeptical testing as has been done has been limited to single formulations of hypotheses, in a small number of organismal structures and groups. This imbalance might seem to be an artifact of the way the subject has been presented here: The emphasis has been on theory, and empirical treatments have been discussed only so far as they show how the various candidate variables might be operationalized. However, this organization was itself partly a result of the imbalance in the field. Very little hypothesis testing has been done. EVOLUTIONARY PROGRESS Ayala (5, 6) has argued that progress contains both a descriptive component and an axiological or evaluative component. Thus, a statement that the evolution of some feature of organisms has been progressive is implicitly both a claim that directional change has occurred in that feature, a description, and also that the change was good or valuable by some standard, an evaluation. Accepting this decomposition of the term progress, I would add that the value component has two senses: First, a feature of organisms can be valued by human beings. [It was the cultural embeddedness of our values on the matter of change that led Gould (30) to reject the notion of progress.] Second, it can be valued by the evolutionary process itself. Obviously, the process does not value anything consciously, but it might value a feature in the sense that it tends to generate or preserve it. (This second sense is somewhat weaker because it is metaphorical.) Undoubtedly, it is valuation in this sense that is implicit in most contemporary discussions of evolutionary progress (41, 85) .
However, I do not frame the issue that way here; that is, I disallow the second sense of value. The reason is that doing so could force us to accept some odd claims, to allow that evolutionary changes of a sort that we do not value at all nevertheless constitute progress. The risk might seem slight, because historically the principal candidates for evolutionary progress have been features that we often do value, in some senses, at least in ourselves: intelligence, adaptability, ability to modify and control the environment, efficiency, and so on (5, 6, 37, 94) . But no largest-scale trend has yet been demonstrated in any of these, and in the meantime we should consider the possibility that the features in which largest-scale trends are eventually found-if any are found-will not turn out to be so agreeable. For example, if developmental entrenchment increases, it should produce a long-term reduction in evolvability. Or a long-term tendency for higher levels of organization (such as the colony or the society) to emerge and to become more individuated might result in a continual reduction in autonomy for entities at lower levels (such as individuals; see 87) . Trends that sound even more unfortunate, from our perspective, can doubtless be imagined. And it would, I think, sound very strange to call any of these progress.
Finally, a comment on complexity: In discussions of largest-scale trends, it has been common to substitute the word complexity for progress, as though they were synonyms (discussed further in 60, 65) . The substitution may be appropriate if, in the exploratory mode, a temporary label is needed to describe a not-yet-completely-specifiable "something" that is thought to progress in the second sense above; complexity, at least in its colloquial sense, is sufficiently vague to make it suitable for that purposes. However, in making this substitution, we should be aware, first, that progress (in the second sense above), and therefore complexity, may not be a good thing, by human standards. And further, there is a risk of some confusion developing between a deliberately vague usage of complexity and the very precise, technical usages of the term that have been devised in physics (9) , as well as in biology (65, 104) . I expect that as these technical approaches mature, and as complexity in its various technical senses becomes better understood, using the term as a placeholder will become less and less appropriate. 
